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ABSTRACT
Credit default swaps (CDSs) gained notoriety for their role in the global financial
crisis. In late 2011, the IRS proposed new regulations that would classify CDSs
bought by someone who does not own the credit, known as “naked” CDSs, as
“financial instruments” and thereby qualify them for the highly beneficial capital
gains tax treatment. This classification is incorrect.
Naked CDSs, which constitute about 80% or more of all CDSs, are not financial
instruments at all. Rather, this article argues, they are gambling wagers—the
winnings on which are taxable at the ordinary income tax rate. This is not the radical
suggestion it may seem. In fact, Congress acknowledged that certain derivatives,
including CDSs, might constitute gambling when it exempted them from “any State
or local law that prohibits or regulates gaming.” While the exemption decriminalized
Naked CDSs, it made no change to their tax status.
Under existing law, this tax rate would apply to the winnings of hedge funds and
hedge fund managers through their so-called carried interests. The 20% difference on
perhaps hundreds of billions of dollars of income is highly significant to a financially
strapped U.S. Treasury. In addition, as gambling income, Naked CDS winnings of
hedge fund managers are subject to the 2.9% Medicare tax, and most Naked CDSs
are also subject to a 2% federal excise tax on gambling.
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I. INTRODUCTION

C

redit default swaps (CDSs), arcane “financial products”
developed in the mid-1990s, are widely regarded as a significant
contributing factor to the global financial crisis that followed barely a
decade later.1 While disastrous for some participants,2 the CDS
“market” was immensely profitable for others.3
In August 2004, the IRS sought information in connection with
requests from “taxpayers and industry groups” for guidance on the
proper tax treatment for CDSs.4 After more than seven years of
waiting, the IRS issued its proposed regulation.5 The fine print of the
proposed regulation provides a tax giveaway that amounts to perhaps
hundreds of billions of dollars to the very investment banks, hedge
fund managers, and others that made vast fortunes helping to bring
about that crisis.
A CDS is a contract under which a “protection buyer” agrees to
make payments, the “premium,” to a “protection seller” in exchange
for a larger lump-sum payment if a third-party borrower, known as a
“reference entity,” defaults on its obligation, the “reference
obligation.”6 The CDS identifies a “notional amount” of the reference
obligation covered, upon which the reciprocal payments are computed,
and the duration for which the coverage will last, usually five years.7
In a hypothetical example, suppose hedge fund A agrees to pay
insurance company B a $2.50 (2.5%) per year premium on a $100
1

2

3

4
5

6

7

See, e.g., John Grgurich, Credit Default Swaps: Still Here, Still Able to Wreak
Havoc, DAILY FINANCE (May 11, 2012), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2012/05
/11/jpmorgan-credit-default-swaps-still-wreaking-havoc/.
See, e.g., Michael Lewis, The Man Who Crashed the World, VANITY FAIR, Aug.
2009, at 98, 98–99.
See, e.g., Gary Weiss, The Man Who Made Too Much, UPSTART BUS. J. (Jan. 7,
2009, 8:00 AM), http://upstart.bizjournals.com/executives/features/2009/01/07/
John-Paulson-Profits-in-Downturn.html.
I.R.S. Notice 2004-52, 2004-2 C.B. 168.
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3, 76 F.R. 57684 (Sept. 16, 2011) (proposing to
treat CDSs as notional principal contracts under I.R.C. § 1256(b)(2)(B)).
Product Descriptions and Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L SWAPS AND
DERIVATIVES ASS’N, http://www.isda.org/educat/faqs.html#26 (last visited Sept.
22, 2012), cited in Lawrence Lokken, Taxation of Credit Derivatives 3, (Univ.
of Fla. Col. Of Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2009-39), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1509681.
Lokken, supra note 6, at 3–4.
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notional amount of a debt owed by investment bank C to lender D, and
if C defaults on that debt, B agrees to pay A $100. C and D are not
parties to the CDS transaction or even necessarily aware of the CDS
transaction.
In a real life example, on October 21, 2008, a notional amount of
$360 billion in CDSs on reference obligations of a single borrower,
Lehman Brothers, came home to roost.8 One CDS on Lehman Brothers
debt was bought by a hedge fund for $22 million and is said to have
returned $1 billion to the buyer9—almost fifty to one—far in excess of
the highest odds at a roulette table.10 Apparently, CDSs bought on
Lehman Brothers debt and sold by American International Group, Inc.
(“AIG”) triggered AIG’s financial collapse and the massive U.S.
government bailout that followed.11
As the CDS market developed, the total notional amount of CDSs
far exceeded the amount of debt that could possibly go into default.12
A small percentage of CDS buyers may actually have owned the
reference obligation and had a legitimate financial risk to hedge;
however, most CDS buyers had nothing at stake and were simply

8

9
10

11

12

See Kim A. Olsen, Pay-up Time for Lehman Swaps, ASIA TIMES ONLINE (Oct.
22, 2008), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/JJ22Dj03.html; see
also Louise Armitstead & Peter Koenig, Market Holds Breath as $360bn
Lehman Swaps Unwind, THE TELEGRAPH (UK), Oct. 18, 2008, http://www
.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/3224615/Markets-hold-breath-as-360bnLehman-swaps-unwind.html.
See Weiss, supra note 3.
CATALIN BARBOIANU, ROULETTE ODDS AND PROFITS: THE MATHEMATICS OF
COMPLEX BETS 20 (2007) (demonstrating that the highest pay out on a roulette
wheel, from “the straight up” bet, is thirty-five to one and that the odds of
winning the straight up bet are thirty-seven to one).
See Lokken, supra note 6, at 1–2. See generally, MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG
SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010), for a fascinating and highly
readable explanation of how the massive growth in CDSs helped to fuel the U.S.
real estate mortgage bubble, the popping of which in 2008 sent the world
financial markets into collapse and the world economy into recession.
See Gretchen Morgenson, Arcane Market is Next to Face Big Credit Test, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/17
/business/17swap.html (“Since 2000, [the CDS market] has ballooned from
$900 billion to more than $45.5 trillion—roughly twice the size of the entire
United States stock market.”); see also Lokken, supra note 6, at 2 (estimating
that the notional amounts of outstanding CDSs exceeded $60 trillion at the end
of 2007).
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piling on side bets, so-called “Naked CDSs,” hoping to profit
vicariously from the random misfortune of a stranger.13
The 2004 IRS Notice indicates that a variety of taxation theories
for CDSs had been advanced by analogy to exotic financial devices.14
According to the Notice, “analogies for a CDS include a derivative
financial instrument such as a contingent option or notional principal
contract, a financial guarantee or standby letter of credit, and an
insurance contract.”15 More recently, certain academics have argued
that, for tax purposes, CDSs do not fit correctly into any of those
classifications. One author, for example, has argued that CDSs belong
in his own newly-invented classification, “annuity-paid deep out-ofthe-money derivative contracts.”16 Another has argued that taxation of
CDSs should be addressed with new legislation.17

13

14
15
16

17

See, e.g., Richard Beales, Uncertain Road Ahead for Delphi, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 7,
2005, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f6a5d3e4-4fb6-11da-8b720000779e2340.html (noting that when Delphi, General Motors’ parts supplier,
went bankrupt in 2005, “the notional amount of credit derivatives referencing
the company was more than 10 times the $2 [billion] or so of bonds
outstanding”); see also Lokken, supra note 6, at 4–5 (discussing how the
industry was forced to migrate from its original standard form swap contracts,
which contemplated the physical delivery of the actual reference obligation by
the protection buyer to the protection seller, to forms that provided either for
settlement in cash, optionally or exclusively, whereby the protection seller
simply writes a check if the obligation defaults, but nothing is transferred by the
protection buyer in return).
See I.R.S. Notice 2004-52, 2004-2 C.B. 168, 168–169.
Id.
See Ari J. Brandes, A Better Way to Understand the Speculative Use of Credit
Default Swaps, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 263, 263–267 (2009).
See Lokken, supra note 6, at 14–15 (“A solution that might ultimately become
the best alternative—marking credit default swaps to market . . . . [But a] markto-market regime for credit default swaps could only be instituted by a statutory
change”). Professor Lokken’s proposal appears to have been rejected, at least
insofar as Congress in 2010 amended I.R.C. § 1256(b) expressly to exclude
credit default swaps from its mark-to-market provisions. Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, sec. 1601(a), Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1256(b)(2)(B) (Supp. IV
2011)). Under proposed regulations, CDSs would be taxed instead as “notional
principal contracts.” Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3, 76 F.R. 57684–85 (Sept. 16,
2011).
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It is often said, however, that the simplest explanation is usually
the right one.18 Whether some exotic analogy is necessary to
understand how to tax a CDS where the buyer actually has a legitimate
financial risk to hedge,19 the simple explanation as to a Naked CDS is
that it is gambling. “A person engages in gambling when he stakes or
risks something of value upon the outcome of a contest of chance or a
future contingent event not under his control or influence, upon an
agreement or understanding that he will receive something of value in
the event of a certain outcome.”20 Naked CDSs should be taxed the
same way as any other gambling.
This is not the radical suggestion it might seem.21 In fact, Congress
confirmed that certain derivatives, including CDSs, constitute
18

19

20
21

See R. H. Helmholz, Ockham’s Razor in American Law, 21 TUL. EUR. & CIV.
L.F. 109, 110–11 (2006) (“[C]omplicated explanations of observed phenomena
should not ordinarily be accepted without proof of their necessity. Simpler
explanations are to be preferred.”) (citing Pluralitas non est ponenda sine
necessitate, Ordinatio I, d. 30 q. 2, in 4 WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, OPERA
THEOLOGICA 322 (G.I. Etzkorn & Francis Kelly eds., 1979)).
The scope of the IRS Notice is not limited to Naked CDSs, and it recognizes that
“[a] relevant factor [in the consideration of analogs] may be how much of the
CDS protection-buying market consists of persons who do not have or expect to
be exposed to credit risk.” I.R.S. Notice 2004-52, 2004-2 C.B. at 169. For tax
purposes, the difference between hedging transactions and those entered into for
speculation is well recognized. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(f)(2)(v) (1994)
(setting out specific rules for transactions “entered into primarily to reduce risk
with respect to a specific debt instrument or group of debt instruments held or
issued by the taxpayer”); Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(b)(1)–(3) (2007) (specifying
different tax treatment for hedging and non-hedging transactions and defining
the former as “any transaction that a taxpayer enters into in the normal course of
the taxpayer’s trade or business primarily—(1) to manage risk of price changes
or currency fluctuations with respect to ordinary property . . . that is held or to
be held by the taxpayer, (2) to manage risk of interest rate or price changes or
currency fluctuations with respect to borrowings made or to be made, or
ordinary obligations incurred or to be incurred, by the taxpayer, or (3) to manage
such other risks as the Secretary may prescribe in regulations . . . .”).
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00(2) (McKinney 2012).
See Mark Sunshine, “Stupid is as Stupid Does”, THE SUNSHINE REP. (Dec. 27,
2008), http://www.thesunshinereport.net/marksunshine/?p=223 (“[W]hen the
speculator doesn’t have an underlying economic interest . . . it’s high stakes
gambling at its best.”); Jane Hamsher, Geitner Endorses Naked Credit Default
Swaps,
FIREDOGLAKE.COM
(Mar.
26,
2009,
9:35
AM),
http://firedoglake.com/2009/03/26/geithner-endorses-naked-credit-defaultswaps/ (quoting Dean Baker in reference to naked CDSs: “We tax gambling in
Las Vegas”); DEAN BAKER, CENTER FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES., THE BENEFITS OF
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gambling when in 2000, to allay industry fears that CDSs were illegal
gambling,22 it exempted them from “any State or local law that
prohibits or regulates gaming.”23 While the exemption decriminalized
Naked CDSs,24 it made no change to their tax status.
By contrast, the proposed regulations incorrectly categorize every
CDS as a “notional principal contract” (NPC), a kind of financial
instrument entitled to special, highly favorable capital asset tax
treatment.25 That categorization is a product of rogue agency action;
Congress never authorized this for Naked CDSs.26
The proposed regulations would provide a massive tax windfall to
some of the nation’s wealthiest taxpayers,27 at a time when the

22

23
24

25
26
27

A FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS TAX 3 (2008) (arguing in favor of a tax on
financial speculation and noting that taxing transactions that are most
comparable to gambling could result in their cessation). But see Kristin N.
Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons, 82
U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 197–98 (2011) (arguing against the application of
gambling as an analogy to CDSs).
See, e.g., Hearing to Review the Role of Credit Derivatives in the U.S. Economy:
Hearing Before H. Comm. on Agriculture, 110th Cong. 81 (2008) (statement of
Eric Dinallo, Superintendent of New York State Ins. Dept.) (“With the growth
of various kinds of derivatives in the late 20th Century, there was legal
uncertainty as to whether certain derivatives, including credit default swaps,
violated state bucket shop and gambling laws. [The Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000] created a ‘safe harbor’ by . . . preempting state and
local gaming and bucket shop laws . . . .”); see also 7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2) (2000),
amended by Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, sec. 117, Pub. L.
No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763.
7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2) (2006).
Id. It remains unlawful to buy insurance on the life of a stranger. See, e.g., N.Y.
INS. LAW § 3205(b)(2) (McKinney 2012). That is, at least, until the day an
enterprising financial professional similarly persuades Congress to legalize
“health default swaps.”
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3, 76 F.R. 57684, 57685–86. (Sept. 16, 2011).
See Lokken, supra note 6, at 14.
See Gretchen Morgenson, It’s Time for Swaps to Lose Their Swagger, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/business/economy
/28gret.html (“United States commercial banks . . . held $13 trillion in notional
value of credit derivatives at the end of the third quarter [of 2009], according to
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. The biggest players in this world
are JP Morgan Chase, Citibank, Bank of America and Goldman Sachs.”).
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government doesn’t have a nickel to spare.28 Meanwhile, the Occupy
Wall Street movement, Warren Buffett, and the typical American
wage earner are already outraged that “the 1%” pays taxes at a much
lower rate than “the 99%.”29 The difference to the U.S. Treasury
between tax-advantaged financial instruments and the less friendly
treatment of gambling, which reflects the predictable divide between
how the moneyed and non-moneyed classes are taxed, is very
significant, potentially involving hundreds of billions of dollars of lost
tax revenue if Naked CDSs are misclassified.
After the introduction in Part I, this article argues in Part II that
Naked CDSs constitute gambling wagers, not financial instruments.
Part III discusses the current tax treatment of gambling and how it
should apply to Naked CDSs. Throughout Part III, comparisons are
drawn between gambling wagers and Naked CDSs to illustrate the
implications that would follow from the federal treatment proposed in
this article. These implications include the federal excise tax of up to
2% on wagers,30 the treatment of profits on wagers as ordinary income
rather than capital gains, 31 the 2.9% Medicare tax imposed on income
earned from a trade or business,32 and the limitations on deductions for
gambling losses.33 Since gambling income is taxable in the jurisdiction
in which bets are placed rather than in the jurisdiction in which the
taxpayer resides, like capital gains, there are also significant state
income tax and foreign withholding tax implications that are discussed
in Part III.34
28

29

30
31
32
33
34

See Jackie Calmes, Geithner Asks Congress to Raise U.S. Debt Limit Quickly,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/business
/economy/07debt.html.
See, e.g., James Kwak, Occupy Wall Street’s Top Priority Should Be to Kill the
Bush Tax Cuts, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 17, 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com
/business/archive/2011/10/occupy-wall-streets-top-priority-should-be-to-killthe-bush-tax-cuts/246817/; Steve Jordan, Warren Watch: Buffett Tax Idea
Moves Omaha Native, OMAHA.COM (Oct. 9, 2011), http://www.omaha.com
/article/20111009/MONEY/710099929; Sarah Dutton, Polls Show Longtime
Support for Tax Hikes on Rich, CBS NEWS (Oct. 12, 2011, 12:16 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20119267-503544/polls-showlongtime-support-for-tax-hikes-on-rich/.
See discussion infra Part III.A.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
See discussion infra Part III.C.
See discussion infra Part III.D.
See discussion infra Part III.E.
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While “taxpayers and industry groups” might find it a nasty
surprise to have Naked CDSs taxed as gambling,35 in view of the cost
to the U.S. Treasury of bailing out the financial system from a collapse
caused at least in part by Naked CDSs,36 it seems only appropriate that
those transactions and the very large profits made thereon be taxed for
what they are.37
II. A NAKED CDS IS GAMBLING
The regulations proposed in 201138 arises from a classic flaw in
logic. In 2010, Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code (the
Code) to add CDSs to a list of transactions that are not so-called
§ 1256 contracts.39 The IRS concluded that by this action Congress
intended also to add CDSs to a similar list of what are NPCs.40 If not
35

36

37

38
39

40

The imposition of taxes coming as a nasty surprise to a large class of taxpayers
who thought they were just doing what everybody else was doing is not at all
unprecedented. For example, see I.R.S. Treas. Dir. 04-0407-036, IRM 4.51.5
(June 15, 2007), which discusses hundreds of U.S. corporations issuing
thousands of what they claimed were “incentive stock options” with very
favorable deferred tax treatment, before it was determined that the options had
all been cleverly backdated to place them immediately in the money, and thus
were immediately taxable. There were so many option holders who had not
timely paid the tax on the options before that party ended that the IRS had to
designate the matter an “LMSB Tier I issue” (Large and Mid-Size Business
Division) and establish a formal program to administer the retroactive tax
collections. See id.
See Richard Simon & Nicole Gaouette, Approval of Bailout Comes Amid Signs
That a Steep Recession is Just Beginning, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/04/business/fi-bailout4/2.
This is not to suggest that any wrongdoing is afoot. In fact, during the seven
year absence of requested guidance from the IRS, whatever reporting position a
taxpayer may have taken with respect to Naked CDS transactions may be
perfectly reasonable, even if it is ultimately determined on audit not to be the
correct one. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b) (2003).
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3, 76 F.R. 57684 (Sept. 16, 2011).
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, sec. 1601(a),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ 1256(b)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 2011)).
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3, 76 F.R. at 57684–85 (“Congress incorporated
into section 1256(b)(2)(B) a list of swaps that parallels the list of swaps included
under the definition of a notional principal contract in § 1.446-3(c) with the
addition of credit default swaps. The parallel language suggests that Congress
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A, then B, is a propositional fallacy; it presumes that there is only one
alternative to A, which is not the case.41 In fact, the term “notional
principal contract” is entirely an invention not of Congress, but of the
IRS in its regulations.42 The term does not appear in the § 1256
amendment or, for that matter, anywhere else in the Code. In the
§ 1256 amendment, Congress only said what a CDS is not, never what
it is. As the Conference Report to the amendment stated, “The title
contains a provision to address the recharacterization of income as a
result of increased exchange-trading of derivatives by clarifying that
section 1256 of the Internal Revenue Code does not apply to certain
derivatives contracts transacted on exchanges.”43
Section 1256 contracts are taxed at a hybrid 40% short-term, 60%
long-term capital gains rate.44 The intent of the § 1256 amendment was
to deny this lower capital gains rate to CDSs.45 Under the IRS
regulations on NPCs, a premium payment is taxable as ordinary
income to the protection seller, but a reciprocal payment made on the
termination or assignment of an NPC, which is what normally happens
when a default occurs under a CDS, is taxable to the protection buyer
as capital gain.46 If the premium was paid more than one year earlier,
the reciprocal payment is taxed as long-term capital gain.47 As the
proposed regulations pertain to Naked CDSs, their effect would thus
be the exact opposite of what Congress intended. Treating a Naked
CDS as an NPC disregards the Congressionally recognized

41

42
43

44
45

46

47

was attempting to harmonize the category of swaps excluded under section
1256(b)(2)(B) with swaps that qualify as notional principal contracts under
§ 1.446-3(c) . . . .”).
See THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 316–17 (Robert Audi ed., 2d
ed. 1999) (defining formal fallacy).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(c)(1)(i) (1994) (defining notional principal contracts).
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3, 76 F.R. at 57685 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 111-517,
at 879 (2010) (Conf. Rep.)) (emphasis added).
See I.R.C. § 1256(a)(3) (2006).
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
sec. 1601(a)(2)(B), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 1256(b)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 2011)).
See Lokken, supra note 6, at 28–29 (recommending against treating a CDS as a
NPC because capital asset treatment on a sale or termination of a NPC lets the
buyer take an ordinary deduction on CDSs that do not pay off and selectively
realize capital gain on the ones that do).
I.R.C. § 1222 (2006) (defining long-term capital gain).
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characterization of Naked CDSs as gambling.48 Moreover, this
treatment affirmatively enables the “recharacterization” of the ordinary
income from a winning Naked CDS bet into capital gain, something
Congress expressly sought to prevent.49
An NPC is “a financial instrument that provides for the payment of
amounts by one party to another at specified intervals calculated by
reference to a specified index upon a notional principal amount in
exchange for specified consideration or a promise to pay similar
amounts.”50 A typical NPC would be something like an interest rate
swap, where a party paying interest on a floating interest rate loan gets
rate protection by finding a third party who will take monthly
payments at a fixed rate in exchange for making monthly payments at
the floating rate.
By contrast, with a Naked CDS, a party makes one or more small
payments in exchange for a huge payment if a financial instrument he
does not own goes into default.51 This is indistinguishable from
gambling. It is no different from any other bet placed in exchange for a
payback upon “a future contingent event not under [the bettor’s]
control or influence.”52
A fifty-to-one jackpot on a Naked CDS hardly involves the
“similar amounts” contemplated by the NPC definition.53 Moreover,
the key term, which may be appropriate for a CDS hedging a
legitimate financial risk, is “financial instrument.”54 If that key term is
ignored, and attention is given only to reciprocal payment obligations
rather than the substance of the transaction, the rest of the NPC
definition equally describes not only a Naked CDS, but also a lottery
ticket or a World Series bet.55 Would anyone, except perhaps an
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

See 7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2) (2006).
See Lokken, supra note 6, at 19; Dodd-Frank Act sec. 1601(a).
Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(c)(1)(i) (1994) (emphasis added).
See Lokken, supra note 6, at 8.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00(2) (McKinney 2012).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(c)(1)(i) (1994).
See id.
To qualify, the lottery ticket or World Series bet would technically have to be
paid for in at least two installments. This is because the proposed regulations
include a “new ‘two-payment rule’ for delineating between Section 1256
contracts, such as futures and foreign currency contracts, and notional principal
contracts.” See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3, 76 F.R. 57684, 57687 (Sept. 16,
2011); see also N.Y. BAR ASS’N, REPORT ON PROPOSED AND TEMPORARY
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investment banker on the receiving end of a large payout, have the
audacity to suggest that those latter items are also “financial
instruments” deserving capital gain treatment rather than ordinary
income treatment?56 As the Supreme Court observed in a leading
income tax case involving a professional gambler, “[a] test that
everyone passes is not a test at all.”57
What is it that singles out a Naked CDS from every other gardenvariety bet for celebration as a “financial instrument”? That it is made
on an institutional “trading desk,”58 rather than in a back alley? That it
is written on an International Swaps and Derivatives Association
form,59 rather than a bookie’s notepad? That it looks to the outcome of

56

57
58

59

REGULATIONS UNDER SECTION 871(M), 34–35 (Apr. 25, 2012) (discussing the
“two-payment rule” in the context of tax treatment of accrual amounts).
See generally Luc Sante, Goldman: All Con, No Artist, POLITICO (Apr. 26, 2010,
11:07 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0410/36369.html (suggesting
that the creation and sale of “booby-trapped” wagers by boastful investment
bankers constitutes a confidence game).
Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 34 (1987).
See Philip R. Cleary, Predicting the Taxation of Prediction Markets, 27 VA.
TAX REV. 953, 956–57 (2008) (noting that transactions, including bets on
presidential elections, that “might strike many tax professionals as gambling”
can now be effected through so-called “prediction markets”). Attorney Cleary
argues that something new and exciting that everyone is doing by a different
name shouldn’t be gambling, even if that’s what an old-fashioned Code section
expressly calls it, saying “[i]t is hard to imagine classifying prediction
derivatives as gambling for income tax purposes merely because gambling for
purposes of an excise tax written in 1954 includes wagering pools based on
election outcomes.” Id. at 980. He concedes, however, that the IRS has stated
that it sees “no reason why the income tax meaning of a wager should differ
from the explanation put forth in the Regulations under the excise tax,” and that
“if some or all prediction markets are a form of gambling, then there are
relatively severe tax consequences.” Id. at 978, 980. See also Stephen Zorn,
Federal Tax Treatment of Gambling: Fairness or Obsolete Moralism?, 49 TAX
LAW. 1, 1–2 (1995) (arguing that gambling has become so widespread and
accepted that it should no longer be taxed disadvantageously).
See An Introduction to the Documentation of OTC Derivatives, ALLEN &
OVERY, at 3–4 (May 2002), http://www.isda.org/educat/pdf/documentation
_of_derivatives.pdf. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(“ISDA”) defines “credit derivative” as “a privately negotiated agreement that
explicitly shifts credit risk from one party to the other.” ISDA, supra note 6. The
ISDA defines “credit default swap” as “a credit derivative contract in which one
party (protection buyer) pays an [sic] periodic fee to another party (protection
seller) in return for compensation for default (or similar credit event) by a
reference entity.” Id. In the case of a Naked CDS, there is, by definition, no risk
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a random event involving a corporate security rather than perhaps a
roll of the dice or the pull of a slot machine handle?60
The Wall Street figures who achieved great success buying Naked
CDSs no doubt studied hard and worked with great ingenuity to
improve their odds.61 But so do the people pouring over the Daily
Racing Form looking for long shots at the track. A recent article in
Harper’s Magazine discusses the remarkable “luck” of a Texas
scratch-ticket lottery player who won three jackpots of more than a
million dollars each during the last decade.62 The odds of doing this by
random selection are astronomical. The article speculates that the
winner, a sixty-three-year-old, Stanford University-educated math
professor, who specialized in statistics, might have discovered an
angle.63 But nobody would argue that her lottery winnings were
perhaps instead a tax-exempt stipend for academic research.64 The fact
that a particular player can improve her gambling odds through
personal effort and skill does not alter the fact that she is gambling.65
An IRS spokesperson with responsibility for the proposed
regulations stated to this author that while all derivatives could be
looked at as gambling to some degree, the IRS would not tax them as
such without express congressional action.66 However, this view
misses the point that Congress has acted. By preempting the
application of state gaming laws on certain derivatives, Congress

60

61

62

63
64
65

66

to shift from the buyer, so a Naked CDS does not fall within the ISDA definition
of credit derivative.
See Treas. Reg. § 44.4421-1(b)(1) (2008) (including within the definition of
“lottery” numbers games in which the winning numbers are published in
“United States Treasury balance reports, or the reports of a stock or commodity
exchange”).
See Weiss, supra note 3 (discussing how one hedge fund carefully selected those
reference obligations which were most likely to default); see also LEWIS, supra
note 11, at 202 (describing a credit default swap devised by Morgan Stanley
trader Mike Edman that, through the use of “some fine print,” provided the
buyer with the equivalent of “flood insurance that, if a drop of water so much as
grazed any part of the house, paid them the value of the entire house”).
Nathaniel Rich, The Luckiest Woman on Earth: Three Ways to Win the Lottery,
HARPER’S MAG., Aug. 2011, at 58, 62–63.
Id. at 58.
See I.R.S. Pub. 970, at 6 (2011).
See Baxter v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 912, 917 (D. Nev. 1986) (recognizing
a distinction between active and passive gambling in relation to the tax code).
Telephone interview with K. Scott Brown, I.R.S. Spokesperson (Jan. 30, 2012).
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recognized that at least some derivatives are gambling, not financial
instruments.67 Despite this recognition, Congress did not act to
recharacterize income from any derivatives, let alone income from
whichever ones Congress was protecting from state gambling laws.
A “short seller” of stock may not own the stock on the date of the
short sale, but the short seller typically has borrowed it.68 And because
short sales only account for a tiny fraction of the overall market,69 they
can be covered, or physically delivered upon,70 if necessary, even by a
naked short seller. Certain other kinds of swaps, such as those on
interest rates or equity indexes, may also be “naked” in some respects,
but they are surrogates for securities that could be bought in the
market.71 By contrast, there is typically an insufficient supply of
reference obligations to enable most Naked CDS buyers to cover,72
and often the terms of a Naked CDS do not contemplate or even
permit physical delivery.73

67
68

69

70

71

72

73

See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
See Short Selling Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com
/terms/s/shortselling.asp (last visited Dec. 20, 2012) (“The selling of a security
that the seller does not own, or any sale that is completed by the delivery of a
security borrowed by the seller.”).
See, e.g., Press Release, New York Stock Exchange Euronext, NYSE Group Inc.
Issues Short Interest Report (July 12, 2011) (http://www.nyse.com/press
/1310464193322.html) (stating that in the year ending June 30, 2011, monthly
short interest on the New York Stock Exchange averaged less than 4% of total
shares outstanding).
See Physical Delivery Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com
/terms/p/physicaldelivery.asp (last visited Dec. 20, 2012) (“Term in an options
or futures contract which requires the actual underlying asset to be delivered
upon the specified delivery date, rather than being traded out with offsetting
contracts.”).
See Kevin Dolan & Carolyn DuPuy, Equity Derivatives: Principles and
Practice, 15 VA. TAX REV. 161, 164 (1995) (describing equity derivatives).
See Lewis, supra note 11, at 28–29 (“The bonds were impossible to sell short.
To sell a stock or bond short, you needed to borrow it, and these tranches of
mortgage bonds were tiny and impossible to find. You could buy them or not
buy them, but you couldn’t bet explicitly against them . . . .”).
See Lokken, supra note 6, at 4, 5 n.17 (suggesting that multiple Naked CDSs on
a single reference obligation could in theory physically settle one by one, with
the same reference obligation transferred repeatedly through successive
transactions, but conceding this would likely result in market chaos even if
physical settlement was allowed in the contract).
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And, most importantly, by far, from the buyer’s standpoint, a
Naked CDS is uniquely not a surrogate for any actual security.74 The
buyer of a Naked CDS has no relationship with the reference entity, no
interest in the reference obligation, no control over the default event,
and no risk to guard against.75 The buyer of a Naked CDS is not
investing for market appreciation of an asset over time, the sine qua
non of a capital asset.76 The “buyer” is not actually buying anything at
all; the buyer is not even trying to mimic the market appreciation of an
asset that could be bought. Rather, the Naked CDS buyer is betting
that a future event not under his control will come along and destroy
the value of someone else’s capital asset. The reference obligation is
the last thing the Naked CDS buyer would want to invest in.77
It may very well be that “covered” CDSs, where the buyer is
actually at risk on an underlying bond or other financial instrument,
are themselves properly characterized as some kind of financial
instrument for tax purposes, but there is simply nothing “financial”
about a Naked CDS.78 To the holder of a Naked CDS, the reference
obligation has no economic significance and is a complete
abstraction.79
If a Naked CDS is not the derivative that required preemption from
state gambling laws, it is hard to imagine the transaction more
74

75

76
77
78

79

See Lokken, supra note 6 at 8; Johnson, supra note 24, at 197 (“[I]nnovators
created a credit default swap agreement that did not require the protection buyer
to own the reference asset mentioned in the credit default swap agreement.
Market participants describe these agreements as ‘uncovered’ . . . or naked
credit default swaps”).
See, e.g., Gregory Zuckerman, A Daring Trade Has Wall Street Seething, WALL
ST. J., June 11, 2009, at C1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB124468148614104619.html (discussing bets of $130 million made by J.P.
Morgan, Royal Bank of Scotland Securities, Bank of America, and others on the
performance of around $27 million in securities issued by Lehman Brothers in
2005 where the Texas protection seller who took the bets cleverly bought up all
the particular bonds in question, ensuring that no default would occur).
See infra Part III.B.
See Sunshine, supra note 24.
The IRS has suggested that Naked CDSs serve a useful function, providing
“liquidity” in the marketplace. Brown, supra note 66. Whether true, however, it
is irrelevant to how Congress intends them to be taxed.
See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 11, at 77 (“The original home mortgage loans on
whose fate both sides were betting played no role. In a funny way, they existed
only so that their fate might be gambled upon.”).
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distanced from legitimate financial activity that Congress had in mind
when it enacted the preemption.80
III. A NAKED CDS IS TAXABLE JUST LIKE ANY OTHER GAMBLING
While the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000
“legalized” Naked CDSs under state gaming laws,81 it did nothing to
suggest that Naked CDSs should be treated differently for tax purposes
than any other form of gambling under either federal or state law.82
Taxing Naked CDSs as gambling has a number of significant tax
implications.
A. Federal Excise Tax on Wagers
Wagers accepted in states where wagers are not authorized by state
law, such as New York, are subject to a 2% federal excise tax.83 In
states where wagers are legal, a 0.25% federal excise tax applies.84 “A
person is engaged in the business of accepting wagers if he makes it a
practice to accept wagers with respect to which he assumes the risk of
profit or loss depending on the outcome of the event or the contest
with respect to which the wager is accepted.”85 It is not necessary that
“a person must be either so engaged to the exclusion of all other
activities or even primarily so engaged.”86

80

81

82

83

84
85
86

Cf., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring) (“I
shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description . . . . But I know it when I see
it . . . .”).
7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2) (2000), amended by Commodity Futures Modernization Act
of 2000, sec. 117, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763.
In determining that the I.R.C. § 4401 wagering excise tax applies to wagering
that itself had been authorized by federal law on an Indian reservation, the
Supreme Court specifically cited the interpretive canon “that warns us against
interpreting federal statutes as providing tax exemptions unless those
exemptions are clearly expressed.” Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S.
84, 95 (2001).
I.R.C. § 4401(a)(2) (2006). New York law prohibits wagers, so wagers there are
subject to the 2% federal excise tax. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00 (McKinney
2011).
I.R.C. § 4401(a)(1) (2006).
Treas. Reg. § 44.4401-2 (b) (2008).
Id.
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“The amount of the wager is the amount risked by the bettor . . .
[not] the amount which he stands to win.”87 In the case of a Naked
CDS, the wager would thus be the premium, the periodic payments
paid for the Naked CDS by the protection buyer to the protection
seller, not the entire notional amount.88
The excise tax must be paid even if the person initially accepting
wagers “lays off all or part of the wagers placed with him with another
person.”89 Thus, the tax would be paid even when the person accepting
the wager hedges the Naked CDS sold with a Naked CDS purchased
from a different protection seller. However, the person initially
accepting a wager may apply for a refund if the lay-off is to another
person subject to the excise tax who certifies that he will pay the tax.90
Notably, the wagering excise tax is a joint and several obligation of
both the entity accepting the wager and the individual accepting the
wager on behalf of the entity, for example, an individual employee on
a trading desk, unless that individual has previously personally
registered with the IRS as a wager taker.91
Consider this proposed tax treatment in the context of a real
example. According to The Securities and Exchange Commission
2010 securities fraud complaint (the “SEC Complaint”) against
Goldman, Sachs & Co. (“Goldman”) and Fabrice Tourre, a Goldman
Vice President in charge of its “structured product correlation trading
desk,” the Goldman office in New York sold a Naked CDS to hedge
fund Paulson & Co. (“Paulson”).92 If the Naked CDS is considered a
wager, then Paulson’s premium payments to Goldman would be
subject to a 2% excise tax.93 Payment of that excise tax would be a
joint and several liability of Goldman and any individual Goldman
employee who accepted the wager on behalf of Goldman unless the
individual was himself personally registered as a wager taker.94

87
88
89
90
91
92

93
94

Treas. Reg. § 44.4401-1 (b)(2)(i) (2008).
See Lokken, supra note 6 at 3.
Treas. Reg. § 44.4401-2(c) (2008).
Id. at § 44.6419-2(b)
I.R.C. § 4401(c) (2006).
Complaint at 2, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp.2d 147 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (No. 1:10CV03229) [hereinafter Complaint].
See I.R.C. § 4401(a)(2) (2006).
Id. § 4401(c) (2006).
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Following along with the analysis, Goldman would be said to have
laid off the bet it made with Paulson by buying matching Naked CDSs
from ACA Capital Holdings, Inc. and ABN AMRO Bank N.V. for a
total of sixty-seven basis points (0.67%) per year.95 The SEC
Complaint doesn’t state what Goldman charged Paulson for the Naked
CDSs it sold, but if Goldman were, for example, collecting 250 basis
points (2.50%) from Paulson on the notional amount of Naked CDSs it
sold,96 and paying only sixty-seven basis points (0.67%) on an
equivalent notional amount of Naked CDSs it bought, it would thereby
have laid off the entire bet, while netting almost three quarters, 183
basis points (1.83%), of the amount wagered for itself.
If the notional amount of the Naked CDSs sold to Paulson were $1
billion, as suggested by what Paulson eventually collected on its bet,97
the amount of the wager at 2.5% would have been $25 million per
year, and a 2% excise tax on that would be $500,000 per year.
While the entire $500,000 excise tax would have to be paid each
year by Goldman (or by an unregistered individual wager taker who
accepted the Naked CDS on Goldman’s behalf), Goldman (or such
individual) would be entitled to apply for a refund to the extent that the
entities to which Goldman laid off the bet certified they would pay it;
that is, the net liability could be less if ACA and ABN AMRO took
responsibility for the excise tax on the portions laid off.98 However,
wagers are only subject to the excise tax if they have sufficient U.S.
ties.99 So, if the lay-off to ABN AMRO, a large foreign bank, were
accepted off-shore, it would not appear to be subject to the excise tax
and able to give rise to a refund to Goldman.100
Extrapolating the proposed tax treatment from this single $1 billion
CDS transaction to a perhaps $60 trillion total CDS market, of which
perhaps 80%,101 $48 trillion, is “naked,” an average premium of 2.5%
95
96

97
98
99
100
101

See Complaint, supra note 92, at 2.
See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 11, at 75–76 (providing an example of one Naked
CDS sold by Goldman at a 2.5% premium, although this may not be
representative).
See id. at 237–38.
See Treas. Reg. § 44.4401–2 (2008); Treas. Reg. § 44.6419-2(b) (2008).
Treas. Reg. § 44.4404-1(a) (2008).
See id.
See Andrew Leonard, Credit Default Swaps: What Are They Good For?,
SALON.COM, (Apr. 20, 2010, 4:21 PM), http://www.salon.com/2010/04/20
/naked_credit_default_swaps.
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of the notional amount would represent a possible total of $1.2 trillion
of wagers that could be subject to a 2% excise tax. That would
generate a possible $24 billion per year in tax revenue. However, the
actual number is difficult to estimate because an indeterminate but
probably large portion of that $60 trillion total market may represent
bets laid off multiple times, premiums vary depending on the
perceived risk of default, and some portion of the market is
offshore.102 But the number would nevertheless represent a large
amount of tax revenue.103
B. Ordinary Income, Not Capital Gain
Gambling income is taxed as ordinary income.104 A wager is not a
capital asset for tax purposes.105 This is so despite the broad “property
held” language of the Code’s definition of capital asset and the
absence of any express exclusion from that definition for wagers.106 In
rejecting a taxpayer’s argument that the sale of a winning lottery ticket
held by the taxpayer qualifies for capital gain treatment, the Ninth
Circuit stated that Maginnis, the taxpayer:
(1) did not make any underlying investment of capital in return for
the receipt of his lottery right, and (2) the sale of his right did not
reflect an accretion in value over cost to any underlying asset
Maginnis held.
....
Maginnis does not—and cannot—argue that the purchase of a
lottery ticket is a “capital investment,” the return from which
should be treated as a capital gain. . . . The lottery prize would
have been taxed at ordinary income rates, reflecting the Revenue
Code’s general position that gambling winnings are not treated as
102

103
104

105
106

Gerald P. Dwyer & Thomas Flavin, Credit Default Swaps on Government Debt:
Mindless Speculation?, CENT. FOR FIN. INNOVATION & STABILITY (Sept. 2010),
available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/cenfis/pubscf/nftv_0910.pdf
(showing that CDSs premiums on debt issued by Greece skyrocketed as it faced
default beginning as early as 2010).
See I.R.C. § 4401(c) (2006).
See, e.g., United States v. Maginnis, 356 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004);
Watkins v. Comm’r, 447 F.3d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir. 2006). But see Robida v.
Comm’r, 460 F.2d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 1972) (“Gambling receipts have been
considered . . . more clearly akin to return on capital . . . than earned
compensation for services performed.”).
See Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1184; Watkins, 447 F.3d at 1273.
See Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1182; Watkins, 447 F.3d at 1271-72.
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capital gains. Therefore, the purchase of a lottery ticket is no more
an underlying investment of capital than is a dollar bet on the spin
107
of a roulette wheel.

A Naked CDS fits squarely into the Ninth Circuit’s description of
what is not a capital asset. There is no underlying investment of
capital, no underlying asset held, just “a dollar bet on the spin of a
roulette wheel.”108 Congress, by the § 1256 amendment, expressly
denied CDSs even a hybrid 40%-short-term, 60%-long-term capital
gains tax rate.109 Accordingly, and whether a Naked CDS wager “pays
off” by settlement or termination payment from the protection seller or
by a sale of the Naked CDSs to a third party, it must give rise to
ordinary income, not capital gain.110
Much has been made in the perennial debate over income tax
reform of the need to change the law providing special tax treatment
for so-called carried interests of hedge fund managers, under which a
significant part of their compensation can come to them as a share of
the long-term capital gains of the hedge fund, taxable at low long-term
capital gains rates rather than much higher ordinary income rates, even
though it is paid in exchange for their services.111 By contrast with a
107

108
109
110
111

Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1183–84 (emphasis added). The Maginnis court based its
holding largely on an earlier Supreme Court case that said that capital asset
treatment would not be available “when there is no evidence of a sale of an
underlying capital investment,” and the transaction is “‘manifestly not of the
type which gives rise to the hardship of the realization in one year of an advance
in value over cost built up in several years, which is what Congress sought to
ameliorate by the capital-gains provisions.’” Id. at 1183 (quoting Comm’r v.
Gillette Motor Transport, Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 135 (1960)); accord Watkins, 447
F.3d at 1272 (quoting Comm’r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 265 (1958)
(“capital gains treatment of the lump sum is inappropriate. This is so because the
‘consideration was paid for the right to receive future income, not for an
increase in the value of income-producing property’”)).
Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1184.
I.R.C. § 1256(a)–(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
See Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1183.
See Laura Saunders, ‘Carried Interest’ in the Crosshairs, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6,
2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405311190388560457648654176
1322496.html. A carried interest is a share of the profits of a partnership
allocated to a partner that is disproportionately large relative to the partner’s
contribution of capital to the partnership, typically in consideration of services
provided by the partner. Id. The taxation of hedge fund managers’ carried
interests has long been a contentious issue in tax reform discussions because, to
the extent the profits so allocated consist of long-term capital gains, the partner,
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fund manager’s share of true capital gains made by a hedge fund,
however, a hedge fund manager’s carried interest allocation of
gambling income must always be ordinary income, under existing
law.112
John Paulson, the named principal of the hedge fund involved in
the Naked CDS transaction with Goldman that is the subject of the
SEC Complaint, reportedly earned $3.7 billion in 2007 by predicting
the downfall of Wachovia, Washington Mutual, Lehman Brothers, and
certain other institutions:
Since all that toxic waste on the balance sheet imperiled the
survival of the banks, Paulson wanted to be sure he was prepared.
So he bought credit default swaps, like the $22 million he bet
against Lehman—essentially an insurance policy that paid off
when Lehman’s bonds defaulted. Even though Paulson didn’t
actually own any Lehman bonds, he made more than $1 billion on
that bet. It’s as though he’d bought insurance policies on houses he
didn’t own along the Indian Ocean just moments before the
113
tsunami hit.

Mr. Paulson’s tax return is not in the public record, of course,114 so
there is no way to know how he characterized income from Naked
CDSs. But on a pay out of $3.7 billion, the difference between a 15%
long-term capital gain tax and a 35% top bracket ordinary income tax
is $740 million for that single year.115 And Mr. Paulson is not alone in

112
113

114
115

who could be earning millions or even billions of dollars a year, gets a paycheck
exempt from payroll taxes and subject to only a 15% federal income tax rate.
See Jenny Anderson, Scrutiny on Tax Rates That Fund Managers Pay, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 2007, at C3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007
/06/13/business/13tax.html.
See I.R.C. § 165 (2006); Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1183.
Weiss, supra note 3. The SEC Complaint notes that Paulson was actively
involved in selecting the particularly vulnerable reference obligation portfolio as
to which it bought the Naked CDSs from Goldman. See Complaint, supra note
92, at 2–3, 25. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, one expert on structured
finance observed, “[W]hen you buy protection against an event you have a hand
in causing, you are buying fire insurance on someone else’s house and then
committing arson.” Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Banks Bundled
Mortgage Related Debt, Bet Against It and Won, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009, at
B4.
I.R.C. § 6103(a) (2006).
See I.R.S. Pub. 17 at 104, 115, 274 (2011).
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having made large profits on Naked CDSs.116 The Big Short recounts
the stories of several different hedge funds and their managers that
made tens to hundreds of millions of dollars on Naked CDSs,117 and
great success by other hedge fund managers has also been reported.118
The same potential 20% federal income tax rate differential would
apply to Naked CDS income allocated by a hedge fund not only to its
general partner-managers, but also to its limited partner-investors. In
other words, the remaining typically 80% of the fund’s income not
allocated as carried interest to the general partner would be reportable
as ordinary income, not capital gain, by its limited partners.119
C. Medicare Taxes
Income earned through a trade or business, either directly or by
allocation from a partnership, is generally considered net earnings
from self-employment120 and subject to federal self-employment
taxes.121
Capital gains are excluded from the definition of net earnings from
self-employment.122 Further, “[t]he character of any item of
income . . . included in a partner’s distributive share . . . shall be
determined as if such item were realized directly from the source from
which realized by the partnership . . . .”123 As a result, even though
116

117
118

119
120

121

122
123

See LEWIS, supra note 11, at 105–06 (Whitebox, The Baupost Group, Passport
Capital, Elm Ridge, Elliot Associates, Cedar Hill Capital Partners, QVT
Financial, Hayman Capital, and Pennant Capital are among those listed by the
author as having profited by betting against subprime mortgages).
Id.
See, e.g., Chris Serres, From Iron Range hockey hero to Wall Street star,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, July 6, 2008, available at http://www
.startribune.com/business/22949299.html (reporting that Philip Falcone of
Harbinger Capital Partners, who bet against the housing market in 2006, bought
hundreds of millions of dollars of CDSs that yielded $1.5 billion by the year’s
end).
See supra note 111.
I.R.C. § 1402(a) (2006) (stating that a taxpayer’s net earnings from selfemployment include “gross income derived by an individual from any trade or
business . . . plus his distributive share . . . of income or loss . . . from any trade
or business carried on by a partnership of which he is a member . . . .”).
Id. § 1401 (2006) (net earnings from self-employment are subject to selfemployment taxes).
Id. § 1402(a)(3) (2006).
Id. § 702(b) (2006).
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managing an investment fund is a trade or business for tax purposes,124
much of an investment fund manager’s income typically comes as an
allocation of capital gains of the fund, which retains that character in
the hands of the manager and does not typically bear self-employment
taxes.125
Gambling income, however, is not excluded from the definition of
net earnings from self-employment.126 Accordingly, by contrast with
an allocation of partnership capital gains, an allocation of Naked CDS
winnings by a partnership to its general partner-manager would be
subject to self-employment taxes.127
Although the self-employment 12.4% Social Security tax only
applies to the first approximately $100,000 of income, there is no limit
to the applicability of the 2.9% Medicare tax.128 Thus, for example, if
all of hedge fund manager John Paulson’s $3.7 billion of income in
2007 were attributable to Naked CDS winnings taxed as gambling
income, a Medicare tax on that amount would be more than $100
million.
D. Limitations on Use of Losses
Gambling losses are deductible for federal tax purposes, but only
to the extent of gambling income.129 Since a deduction in excess of
gambling losses is not allowed, gambling losses also do not give rise
to a net operating loss that can be carried back or forward.130
Limiting the use of losses on Naked CDSs to same tax year profits
on Naked CDSs could have significant implications for sellers who
made large profits in the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis
and then incurred large losses in that single year.131 For example,
124
125
126
127

128
129

130

131

See Dagres v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 263, 283–85 (2011).
See I.R.C. § 1402(a)(3) (2006); see also Anderson, supra note 111.
I.R.C. § 1402(a)(2)–(5) (2006).
Limited partner-investors are not, by contrast, engaged in a trade or business, so
income allocated to them would not be subject to self-employment taxes,
regardless of character. See I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13) (2006).
I.R.S. Pub. 334, at 9 (2010).
See I.R.C. §§ 162(a) (2006); id. § 165(d) (2006); see also Boyd v. United States,
762 F.2d 1369, 1372–73 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[A] gambling loss, although it may be
a business expense, is deductible only to the extent of gambling gains.”).
See I.R.C. § 172(c) (2006) (defining “net operating loss” as “the excess of the
deductions allowed by this chapter over the gross income”).
See Lokken, supra note 6 at 14.
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Ambac Financial Group, Inc., the holding company for a now
bankrupt CDS seller, recovered a reported $700 million of tax refunds
for the years 2003–2008 by carrying back more than $3 billion of
losses arising from its subsidiary’s CDS business in subsequent
years.132 To the extent the later year losses were attributable to Naked
CDSs, that carryback is improper and the refund by the U.S. Treasury
should not have been paid.133 Given the size of the Naked CDS market
and the massive losses resulting from the financial crisis, it is likely
that Ambac is not an isolated case,134 and there is a good chance that a
much larger amount of Naked CDS losses has been improperly carried
back to shelter prior year income from the up to 35% federal income
tax rate that should have applied.
These limitations also have post-financial crisis relevance. For
example, JP Morgan/Chase announced a disastrous loss, $2 billion and
counting, on CDSs in 2012.135 To the extent these losses are
attributable to Naked CDSs, they similarly should not be used to offset
JP Morgan/Chase’s regular banking income in 2012 or carried back or
forward to other years.
E. State Income Taxes and Federal Withholding Taxes
A detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this article, but it
bears noting that gambling income characterization of Naked CDS
profits also has state and cross-border tax implications.

132

133

134

135

See Tiffany Kary, Ambac Sues U.S., Seeks Shield for $700 Million Refund,
(Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-09/ambac-sues-u-sseeks-shield-for-700-million-refund-update1-.html; see also Tiffany Kary,
Ambac Financial Files Third Amended Plan of Reorganization, (Feb. 27, 2012)
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-22/ambac-files-amendedreorganization-plan-after-reaching-wisconsin-agreement.html.
See I.R.C. § 172(c) (2006); see also I.R.S. Pub. 550, at 41 (2011) (discussing
loss carryback election for NPCs).
See Erika W. Nijenhuis, New Tax Issues Arising From the Dodd Frank Act and
Related Changes to Market Practices for Derivatives, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 90–
91 (2011) (“When Ambac decided to[apply for carryback adjustments] . . . it did
so on the basis of an opinion from one of the ‘Big Four’ accounting firms,
KPMG.”).
See Mary Childs & Shannon D. Harrington, JPMorgan Losses Spark Frenzy In
Swaps Indexes: Credit Markets, Bloomberg.com (May 14, 2012, 9:09 AM), http
://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-14/jpmorgan-losses-spark-frenzy-inswaps-indexes-credit-markets.html.

160

UMass Law Review

v. 8 | 136

Capital gains on intangibles such as investment securities are
generally taxable in the jurisdiction of the taxpayer’s residence,
without regard to where the gain may have been generated; for
example, buying and selling stock through a broker in California does
not create California taxable income for a non-resident.136 The
aggregate capital gains of a partnership located in one state are
allocated to individual partners who may reside in other states and may
only be taxed on the gains there,137 and U.S.-derived capital gains of
non-resident foreigners are generally not subject to U.S. taxes.138
By contrast, the locus of gambling taxation is where the bet is
accepted.139 Some states tax non-residents on in-state gambling
income,140 some states do not.141 And some states, like New York,
where a significant amount of the CDS market was centered, tax nonresident gambling income only if it is sufficient to rise to the level of a
trade or business.142 Thus, depending on the circumstances, some or all
of the partners could be liable for state income tax on their distributive
shares of a partnership’s Naked CDSs income in the state where the
partnership’s Naked CDSs are accepted, without regard to where any
of the individual partners live. And, while for federal purposes
gambling winnings can be netted against gambling losses in the same
tax year, some states tax gross gambling winnings and limit or deny
entirely any gambling loss offset.143
136
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140
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State of Cal. Franchise Tax Board, FTB Pub. 1100, at 5 (2012), availible at
https://www.ftb.ca.gov/forms/misc/1100.pdf.
David M. Halbfinger, Fund Managers’ Profits Are Ripe for a New Tax, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2010, at A28, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/nyregion
/30hedge.html?_r=0 (discussing a New York proposal to tax the profits of
nonresident hedge fund managers).
I.R.C. § 871(a)(1), (b) (2006) (imposing a 30% tax on a litany of U.S. source
income categories earned by non-resident aliens, but only on capital gains to the
extent that the taxpayer is present in the United States for 183 or more days).
See id. § 4401(a) (2006); see also id. § 4404(a)(1) (2006); Treas. Reg.
§ 44.4421-1 (2008).
See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 270.17(2)(d) (West 2012) (“Income from winnings on a
bet made by an individual while in Minnesota is assigned to this state”).
See, e.g., Conn. Dep’t of Rev. Serv., IP 2011(27), at 2, available at http:
//www.ct.gov/drs/cwp/view.asp?A=1510&Q=493764.
N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., Pub. 88, at 12, 15 (2010), available at http:
//www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/publications/income/2010/pub88.pdf.
See I.R.C. § 63(d) (2006); id. § 165(d) (2006); Mass. Dep’t. of Revenue,
Directive 03-3, Factors For Determining When Gambling is a Trade or Business
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Similarly, the Naked CDS winnings of a non-resident foreigner on
Naked CDSs accepted in the United States could be subject either to
income tax on a U.S. trade or business144 or to backup withholding,145
and the foreign taxpayer’s right to offset losses against winnings could
depend upon the presence and precise terms of a tax treaty between the
United States and the foreign taxpayer’s jurisdiction of residence.146
IV. CONCLUSION
Insofar as Naked CDSs are concerned, the Proposed Regulations
are inconsistent with existing tax law, and would erroneously reduce
applicable tax rates on a massive volume of gambling transactions. A
Naked CDS is not, and should not be taxed as an NPC.
It should not come as a surprise to “taxpayers and industry groups”
that Naked CDSs are taxable as gambling. Congress may in 2000 have
made Naked CDSs legal gambling, but Congress never said Naked
CDSs were also tax-advantaged gambling. The U.S. government has
been driven deeply into debt as a result of a financial crisis precipitated
at least in part by Naked CDSs. It can hardly afford not to aggressively

144

145

146

(2003), n. 1 (“For federal tax purposes, gambling losses may be deducted from
adjusted gross income to the extent of gambling winnings, if the taxpayer
itemizes his or her deductions. Massachusetts does not adopt this federal
deduction.”); Busch v. Comm’r of Revenue 713 N.W.2d 337, 345 n.7 (Minn.
2006) (“Minnesota incorporates the federal AMT calculation method, but
changes it somewhat . . . . The effect of this approach is to use the federal AMT
laws for calculating the gross income subject to the Minnesota AMT, but to
apply Minnesota’s own curtailed list of itemized deductions . . . [which
excluding gambling losses].”).
See I.R.S. Notice 2004-52, 2004-2 C.B. 168, 169. The IRS Notice states that
“insuring risks [from the CDS seller side, if a CDS were deemed to be
insurance] from within the United States could constitute engaging in a trade or
business within the United States,” but does not mention the possibility that
buying Naked CDSs within the United States could also constitute engaging in a
trade or business, including gambling, within the United States. Id. “Nonresident
aliens are taxed at graduated rates on net gambling income won in the U.S. that
is effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business.” I.R.S. Pub. 515, at 27
(2011).
I.R.C. § 871(a)(1) (2006) (imposing a 30% withholding tax on any “amount [of
income] received from sources within the United States by a nonresident alien
individual . . . not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business
within the United States”).
See Park v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 569, 575 (2011).
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pursue tax collections from those who profited so handsomely while
the game was on.

